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"Preliminary Preliminary" Relief Against
Anticompetitive Mergers
Confusion and inconsistency now characterize the law dealing with
the granting of preliminary injunctions against mergers challenged as
anticompetitive under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Act spe-
cifically authorizes district courts to issue such injunctions.' Although
separate, differently-worded statutes (Sections 15 and 16 respectively)
apply to government and private attempts to block mergers,'2 in prac-
tice courts apply to both types the "same conditions and principles"
as courts of equity generally use.3 An applicant for a preliminary in-
junction under either Section 15 or 16 must meet the Section 16
standards and show: (1) probability of success at trial, (2) irreparable
harm to plaintiff pendente lite without the injunction; and (3) dam-
age to the plaintiff pendente lite in the absence of preliminary relief
greater than damage to the defendants should the injunction issue.4
In applying these standards, courts have disagreed markedly, producing
unpredictable and irreconcilable results. A different framework, one
1. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 25, 26 (1970). For the text of § 7 of the Clayton Act, see note 12
infra.
2. Section 16, applying to private party suits, says:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and hate
injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the anti.
trust laws, including sections 13, 14, 18, and 19 of this utle. when and under the
same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that
will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity ... and upon the exccutiozt
of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a
showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary
injunction may issue.
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
Section 15, which concerns government suits, provides:
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of this Act and ...before final decree, the court
may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall
be deemed just in the premises.
15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970).
The statutory reqirement of posting a bond has had no effect on litigation in this
field. No movant has ever been denied relief for failure to comply with this require-
ment, and no bond that has been posted has ever been forfeited. This requirement
has even, at times, been waived by the district courts. E.g., Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp.,
1970 Trade Cas. 73,035 (CD. Cal.) afrd, 428 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1970).
For a discussion of immediacy, see note 24 infra.
3. When deciding government motions, courts refuse to assert in conclusory fashion
that preliminary relief was or was not "just in the premises"; they al ays attempt
to apply some combination of the Section 16 standards. See, e.g., United States v. Ingersoll.
Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
4. City of Louisville v. Louisville Home Telephone Co., 279 F. 949, 956 (Gth Cir.
1922); 0. Fss, INjuNano-,s 1-137 (1971).
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that grants preliminary injunctions in all merger suits, could be em-
ployed more justifiably, with more rational and socially beneficial
results.
I. Probability of Success at Trial
In the first reported action for preliminary relief under Section 16
against an alleged violation of Section 7, the Second Circuit imposed
a light burden on plaintiff regarding probability of success at trial.
According to Hamilton Watch Go. v. Benrus Watch Co.," decided in
1953:
To justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the
plaintiff's right to a final decision, after a trial, be absolutely cer-
tain, wholly without doubt; if the other elements are present
(i.e. the balance of hardships tips decidedly toward plaintiff) it will
ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions so
serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair
ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.0
Inasmuch as any merger raises "serious, substantial, difficult and doubt-
ful" issues under Section 7,7 the Hamilton Watch standard allows all
plaintiffs to satisfy the requirement of showing probable success at trial.
Few courts-including the Hamilton Watch court-have applied that
standard literally.8 Most courts have paid lip service to the "serious
issue" test, and then have proceeded to consider the substance of plain-
5. 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953) [hereinafter cited
as Hamilton Watch].
6. 206 F.2d at 740.
7. See pp. 158-61 infra.
8. In Hamilton Watch, although the Court of Appeals held that actual violation
need not be proved, it expressly referred to the trial court's findings as to their
competition with each other-based upon detailed analysis of the market shares of
the two companies and Benrus' defense that its purchase of Hamilton's stock was solely
for investment-especially one finding that "the purchases [of stock] therefore violated
Section 7." 206 F.2d at 740.
Only one court has ever actually applied the Hamilton Watch standard. In Vanadium
Corporation of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686 (D. Del. 1962), the
court noted the rule that plaintiff "must . .. show a reasonable probability of success
upon final hearing," id. at 697, but then cited with approval the Hamilton Watch
standard, applied it to the facts of the instant case, and granted the injunction.
2. The potential lurks where defendants may have violated, or are threatening to
violate, § 7 of the Clayton Act ....
4. Whether or not defendants' acquisition of plaintiff's stock was solely for in-
vestment within the meaning of § 7 of the Clayton Act . . . presents a serious
question.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
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tiffs' allegations, issuing preliminary injunctions only when actual vio-
lations of Section 7 existed.9 More recent cases no longer make any
pretense of following the Hamilton lWatch standard. They concede
the presence of "serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful" questions,
but deny preliminary relief because the plaintiff failed to prove that
the merger had a "reasonable probability" of being illegal.10 However,
courts mistakenly equate this standard of "reasonable probability" of
success at trial with the question of "whether it [is] likely that the ac-
quisitions sought to be made ... would substantially lessen competi-
tion.""z
The problem with the prevailing standard is that it confuses pre-
liminary and final injunctive relief. It equates probability of success
at trial with probability of lessened competition, in effect requiring
plaintiffs to prove their final case before preliminary relief issues. By
the terms of Section 7, however, a demonstration of probability of
lessened competition forms the basis for final injunctive relief, either
against consummation or for divestiture. Thus, the current standard
for preliminary relief demands proof of an actual violation of Section
7 rather than a reasonable probability of being able to prove such
violation at trial.
This paradox stems from a plainly incorrect reading of the under-
lying statute. The unusual nature of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
colors the type of preliminary relief it warrants. An incipiency statute,
Section 7 tries to prevent evils before they develop. Thus, it makes
illegal mergers that may have the effect of lessening competition or
9. In United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 1 63,244 (E.D. Mo.). the
first reported case under § 15, the court verbally accepted the "serious issue" test of
Hamilton Watch, and then noted that the "complexity" of the case necessitated a full
hearing. Id. at 71,115. This conclusion would seem to mandate issuing a preliminary
injunction if the Hamilton Watch standard were applied, but the court also noted the
"weakness of plaintiff's case" and the "fact" that, "If the case were submitted finally
on the present record, judgment would have to be for the defendants." Id. at 71,117.
71,115. Therefore, the merger was allowed to proceed subject only to a hold.separate
order. In effect, the court was requiring the government to prove its final case before
preliminary relief would issue.
10. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, 294 F. Supp.
1263 (D. Del.), rev'd, 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969); American Smelting & Refining Co. v.
Pennzoil, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 149 (D. Del. 1969); United States v. Aluminum Company of
America, 247 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Mo. 1964); United States v. Parents Magazine Enter-
prises, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas. j 70,437 (N.D. Ill.); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-
American Sugar Co., 143 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
11. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), alffd. 320 F.2d
509, 523 (3d Cir. 1963). This is the only case where an appellate court ever reviewed
the interlocutory order of a district court under § 15, and will probably be the last. See
United States v. FMC Corp., 84 S. Ct. 4 (1963) (decision by Mr. Justice Goldberg in
chambers). District courts have uniformly applied the rule of Ingersolt.Rand since 1963.
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creating a monopoly. 12 Final relief under Section 7 therefore resem-
bles preliminary relief under more typical statutes.' 3
Suppose, for example, a statute proscribed mergers that actually
lessened competition or created a monopoly. Then, under the usual
rules of equity, preliminary relief against consummation of a merger
would issue upon proof of a reasonable probability that the result
would be lessening of competition or monopoly. 14 The injunction
would be vacated at trial upon proof that the merger's actual effect
would not be in violation of the statute.
Section 7 goes beyond this hypothetical statute; it proscribes not only
mergers that actually lessen competition or create monopoly, but also
mergers that may have such a result. Thus, a plaintiff is entitled to
final relief under Section 7 in a situation where not even preliminary
relief would be available under the hypothetical statute. Just as nor-
mally the purpose of preliminary relief is to prevent the existence of
the recognized evil, so Section 7 is the method chosen by Congress to
avoid the evils of monopolization before they fully mature. Congress,
in effect, institutionalized preliminary relief as the basic method for
avoiding lessening of competition through merger.
Sections 15 and 16 of the Clayton Act enhance the incipiency char-
acter of Section 7. These provisions, nearly unique in type, provide
for preliminary relief in advance of a final adjudication that is itself
really preliminary in nature; they provide, in effect, "preliminary pre-
liminary" relief. If the piggyback preliminary relief created by Sec-
tions 15 and 16 is equated with the essentially preliminary effect of
Section 7 itself, and the former is issued only where the right to final
relief under the latter is firmly established, as has been the practice
of most courts, the provisions of Sections 15 and 16 authorizing pre-
liminary relief become meaningless. In place of their two-fold in-
cipiency standard has been substituted the usual test applied to mo-
tions for summary judgment.
In the sense that preliminary relief is "incipient," Sections 15 and
12. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970):
No corporation . . . shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any sec.
tion of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
13. As an incipiency statute, § 7 is not unique. The same is true of § 3 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1970). However, courts considering preliminary relief against violations of these statutes
have also failed to recognize the peculiar relationship between their incipient nature
and the traditional standards for preliminary relief.
14. This assumes, of course, that plaintiff also satisfies the irreparable damage and
balancing of hardships tests. More will be said of these infra.
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16, as a matter of simple statutory interpretation, should properly be
interpreted as providing a means for preventing incipient monopo-
lization when it is first proposed, before it is consummated. Applying
the usual rule of equity to the unusual wording of Section 7 would
result in the grant of preliminary relief whenever the plaintiff demon-
strates a "reasonable probability" that the proposed merger "may"
result in the proscribed evil, which is lessening of competition or crea-
tion of monopoly, as defined by the statute and the courts.
Even on the assumption that not every merger actually violates
Section 7, every merger could still present a reasonable probability
of violation, as the legal standards applied to mergers show.
Horizontal mergers, which involve merging companies that produce
competing goods and sell them in the same market area, are the most
suspect. Courts have held such mergers illegal even when the market
percentages involved were tiny and the industry unconcentrated. 15
Under established legal doctrine, every horizontal merger clearly has
at least a reasonable probability of violating Section 7.
Vertical mergers, in which the merging companies have a pur-
chaser-supplier relationship, face a similar peril. The Supreme Court
has distinguished two economic contexts for vertical mergers: (1)
where a non-integrated company is seeking to match its integrated
competitors, and (2) where a non-integrated company seeks to intro-
duce integration to the industry, or to extend the existing degree of
integration. In both cases, the result has been the same. The Court
has rejected as a defense for a proposed vertical merger 0 tie fact that
an industry is generally integrated, and has held illegal vertical inte-
gration through merger, whether involving small or large companies
in a generally non-integrated industry.17 Thus, all vertical mergers
embrace a reasonable probability of illegality.
Conglomerate mergers, which include any merger which is neither
15. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US. 294 (1962). the Supreme Court held a
merger achieving five per cent control to be illegal where the rest of the industry was
composed of smaller companies. In United States v. Von's Grocery. 384 U.S. 270 (1960)
and United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966). the challenged mergers
joined small companies in industries with moderate concentration. In both cases, the
Supreme Court held the merger to be illegal. In United States v. Aluminum Company
of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964), the Court upheld the government's challenge to a
merger between a large company and one of its small competitors in a moderately
concentrated industry, although the merger added only 1.3,7, to Alcoa's relevant market
share. Mergers between large companies in concentrated industries are presumptively
illegal, not only under § 7 of the Clayton Act, but also under § 2 o the Sherman Act.
16. United States v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Mich. 1963), ard, 405
US. 562 (1972).
17. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Reynolds ,Metals Co. v.
FTC, 509 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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horizontal nor vertical and assume a large variety of forms, have been
the subject of relatively little litigation. (1) Those predominantly
conglomerate mergers with some direct horizontal or vertical effects
are evaluated by the same standards as fully horizontal or vertical
mergers unless the merging companies present the courts with some
plan for avoiding these effects."' (2) Where the merging companies
produce similar or complementary items and might otherwise some
day have decided to compete (product-extension mergers); or sell the
same item in different markets and, but for the merger, might in the
future have decided to compete (market-extension mergers); the Su-
preme Court has indicated that it is unnecessary to prove actual present
intent to extend, but rather just a reasonable probability of entrance
into the new product line or market area.1 (3) For a merger that cre-
ates the probability of reciprocal dealing,20 de minimus market fore-
closure, a standard antitrust threshold, is the only defense available.21
(4) Finally, a conglomerate merger in which none of these effects are
present to significant degree, but in which a larger entity is substi-
tuted for the previously existing one, faces federal opposition merely
because of the size of the merging companies. Although no per se
"deep pocket" prohibition exists, the government's successful judicial
challenge to this type of merger certainly justifies the conclusion that
it has a reasonable probability of violating Section 7.22
This case law interpretation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act offers
no basis for devising a threshold of illegality for any of these types of
mergers. No court has suggested any minimum market shares, market
concentrations, or other factors that would act to create a dividing
line between legal and illegal mergers. Rather, the courts have low-
ered the threshold of illegality, case by case, without ever suggesting
that it could not be lowered further. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
never upheld the legality of a merger since the 1950 amendment of
Section 7. Based upon the absence of any minimum standards, and the
willingness of the courts, especially the Supreme Court, to declare
mergers illegal in the context of ever-reduced market shares and con-
18. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (pre-
liminary injunction issued); 472 BNA ATRR A-1 (July 28, 1970) (injunction vacated).
19. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (product-extension); United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (market extension); United States
v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
20. "Reciprocal dealing" or "reciprocity" refers to the use of buying power to secure
an advantage in the sale of one's products.
21. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
22. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Reynolds Metals Co.
v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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centrations, it is appropriate to conclude that every merger presents
at least a reasonable probability of being in violation of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act as interpreted by the courts.23
II. Irreparable Harm
Having shown a reasonable probability of success at trial, a plaintiff
seeking preliminary relief under Section 15 or 16 must also show
irreparable harm. 24 Damage is not irreparable if it "can be adequately
23. Economics, which courts themselves to some extent have relied upon in merger
cases, see, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 US. 562, 563-71 (1972). supplies an
alternative or supplemental approach to analyzing probability of success at trial. Every
merger of former competitors, i.e., horizontal mergers, necessarily lessens competition
because it reduces the degree of substitutability within the industry by eliminating
one firm's independent production. As the degree of non-availability of substitutes in-
creases, the producing firms' price patterns more closely approach the optimum monopoly
level. Such a decrease of substitutability of production with its accompan)ing increase
in market power and rise in the price level toward the monopoly structure is "lessening
of competition." Potential benefits from a merger, especially potentially available cost
reductions due to economies of scale, are irrelevant to consideration of preliminary relief
under §§ 15 and 16. "A merger is not saved from illegality under § 7 . . . 'because, on
some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed
beneficial.' United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321. 371 (1963)." Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, supra at 570. Moreover, economists offer no trustworthy
means for determining in advance of a merger what the ultimate reckoning will be. Since
the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate the probability of a lessening
of competition, it might be argued that where no conclusion can be reached this
burden is not satisfied. But, by expanding through merger a firm has chosen, at least
implicitly, not to expand through internal growth. The basic difference between these
two forms of growth is that in the latter no increase in market power is guaranteed
because the availability of substitute products is not necessarily diminished, while in
the case of merger some increment in market power is inherently connected with the
expansion.
Mergers between companies not previously competing, ie., vertical and conglomerate
mergers, are said to be anticompetitive in that they foreclose markets or create greater
wealth or size, which by itself supposedly confers some amount of market power
upon a firm. Market foreclosure refers to the ability of a finn operating in two
lines of commerce to guarantee to itself some share of one of those lines because it
has some share of and market power in the second line. This foreclosure reduces the
degree of substitutability within the particular industry. Thus, every consolidation of
firms that results in a multi-level firm presents a probability of lessening competition.
Size enhances market power because of inefficiencies in the capital markets that inure
to the benefit of larger enterprises, giving them an absolute cost advantage over their
smaller competitors that is unrelated to relative efficiencies or risks. Of course, the
same counterarguments can be made to the asserted anticompetitive effects of mergers
of non-competing firms. And they can be answered the same way. Therefore, every
merger between non-competitors also presents a reasonable probability that it may
lessen competition.
24. Proof of the immediacy of the danger of irreparable harm-explicitly required
in private suits-is ordinarily a relatively simple matter. The critical point in time is
reached when the acquiring company is about to secure the election of one or more
of its choices for the board of directors of the target company. In Hamillon Watch.
for instance, the court enjoined Benrus from voting its twenty-four per cent interest
in Hamilton although in American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,
143 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), defendant u-a allowed to vote its twenty-one per
cent interest in the plaintiff because the court found no immediate danger. The dif-
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compensated for by monetary damages."2  This rule necessarily rele-
gates consideration of irreparable damage to discussion of vague, in-
tangible items, not susceptible to precise measurement because tan-
gible, measurable factors could be compensated for by monetary
damages. Among the factors considered by trial courts have been
disruption of management; 26 unsettling of relations with employees
and others; 27 fear of loss of competitive information to the acquiring
company; 28 unrest and uncertainty among customers, distributors and
suppliers of the target company; 29 loss of morale among employees; °0
damage to the target company's goodwill; 31 and access to the target
company's plans, programs and confidential information. 32 In all merg-
ers, a private party plaintiff can demonstrate irreparable harm of at
least one of such types.
33
The Supreme Court has indicated that irreparable injury to the pub-
lic also is relevant in private suits:
[T]he purpose of giving private parties ... injunctive remedies
was not merely to provide private relief, but was to serve as well
the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws. Section 16
should be construed and applied with this purpose in mind....
Its availability should be "conditioned by the necessities of the
public interest which Congress has sought to protect."34
ference was that Hamilton used cumulative voting for elections of its directors, which
guaranteed Benrus participation on the Hamilton Board, whereas American Crystal
Sugar Company did not have such voting, thus assuring that management could elect
its full slate of nominees for the board of directors through its control of sixty-two
per cent of the outstanding stock. A plaintiff cannot afford to wait too long, however,
without inviting chastisement for coining to court at the last possible moment and
thereby forcing a "frustratingly short proceeding." Lunkenheimer Co. v. Condec Corp.,
268 F. Supp. 667, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). (Plaintiff had three months' notice of defendant's
tender offer, but waited until eight days before its expiration to seek preliminary relief
so that it might merge with a third party instead. The injunction was denied.) See
also Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Ila. 1970).
Section 15 does not explicitly mandate any similar finding of immediacy in government
suits, but in practice the Department of Justice only brings these actions when the target
companies are on the verge of consummating their plans. Anticipatory suits would
probably be dismissed for want of jurisdiction under the "cases and controversies" pro.
vision of Article III of the Constitution.
25. Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp. 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).









33. Election of members of plaintiff's board of directors is generally accepted as
causing irreparable injury. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307
(D. Conn. 1953), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp., 1970
Trade Cas. 73,035 (C.D. Cal.), affd, 428 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1970).
34. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130.-31 (1969).
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After full or partial consummation of a merger, the necessarily con-
comitant damage to the competitive situation can never be reversed.
If the private plaintiff is the target of the acquisition, as it usually is,
it suffers irreparable loss of its identity, and if the plaintiff is a com-
petitor, supplier, or customer of the merging companies, it suffers the
irreparable anticompetitive effect of the merger.
Courts have sharply disagreed about whether the government must
plead and prove irreparable damage to the public. In one case, for
example, a court reasoned that the incipiency nature of Section 7 made
it unnecessary for the government to prove hardship or injury to the
public.35 Another court, however, denied preliminary relief partly be-
cause the complaint did not
clearly show by specific facts that the plaintiff United States will
suffer immediate, and irreparable injury, loss, or damage if the
drastic remedy of temporary restraint of the proposed acquisition
... is not invoked.30
This disagreement has never been resolved and, in view of the absence
of appellate review in this field,37 it is unlikely that one position will
soon be universally accepted.
Although courts often have denied preliminary injunctions on the
ground that divestiture upon final adjudication sufficiently protects the
public interest, typically they have done so by simply asserting their be-
lief and without bothering to make any effort to substantiate it.38 On
35. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 1956 Trade Cas. C 68.244 at 71,114
(E.D. Mo.).
36. United States v. Continental Can Co., 1956 Trade Cas. C 68,479 at 72,004 (S.D.N.Y.).
The one court of appeals to consider the issue agreed with Brown Shoe.
A private plaintiff must show that hardship will result to it, but where the United
States is the plaintiff, as here, the United States is not required to prove public
detriment from a merger which would violate the provisions of Section 7 ....
The court below was not required to demonstrate the precise way in which viola-
tions of the law might result in injury to the public interest.
United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 524 (3d Cir. 1963). However, some
courts in other circuits have refused to follow the Third Circuit's rule. In United
States v. Third National Bank in Nashville, 1964 Trade Cas. 71,209 (M.D. Tenn. 1964).
the court placed a burden on the government
to establish . . . that a denial of the injunction will result in a substantial injury
to the general public for which there is no adequate means of redress.
Id. at 79,826. A majority of the cases follow Brow, Shoe and Ingersoll.Rand. See, e.g..
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods, 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Il. 1968); United States
v. Aluminium Ltd., 1965 Trade Cas. C1 71,366 (D.N.J.); United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252
F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J.
1964). However, the minority view suffers no shortage of support. See, e.g., United States
v. Wachovia Corp., 313 F. Supp. 632 (W.D.N.C. 1970); United States v. Gimbel Bros.,
Inc., 202 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Wis. 1962); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 1960 Trade
Cas. 69,698 (S.D. Cal.).
37. See note 11 supra.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminium Ltd., 1965 Trade Cas. ' 71,366 (D-N.J.). But
see FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 621 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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the other hand, whenever a court has attempted to analyze the dynamics
of merger and divestiture it has invariably concluded that divestiture
is an insufficient remedy to restore the pre-merger market conditions' 0
In the context of bank mergers, Congress too has recently rejected the
adequacy of divestiture to protect the public interest. The Bank
Merger Act of 1966 mandates the enjoining of a proposed bank
merger as soon as the government sues to challenge it under the
Sherman or Clayton Acts.40 As both the courts and Congress thus
realize, permitting acquisitions, even temporarily, would undoubtedly
result in passing records, trade secrets and other confidential matters.
"Displacement and dislocation of management personnel, assets and
records of the acquired companies, together with all other matters
concerning the preservation of competitive vigor, should be delayed
until a decision is rendered at a final hearing."'41
A compromise commonly accepted by the courts allows consum-
mation of the merger subject to a "hold-separate order." These orders
generally require the parent to operate the newly acquired company
as an independent subsidiary.4 2 Although courts issuing full prelimi-
39. E.g., Crane Co. v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 280 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1960); United
States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.
1963); see FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606 n.5 (1966); United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 186 (1944).
40. P.L. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); 16 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (1970).
Non-judicial commentators have universally agreed that divestiture, no matter how
carefully planned, is incapable of restoring the pre-merger economic situation in the
relevant markets. See Note, Preliminary Injunctions for the FTC in Merger Cases, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1967); Note, Preliminary Relief for the Government Under Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 79 HARv. L. REv. 391, 392 (1965); Comment, The FTC's Power to Seek
Preliminary Injunctions in Anti-Merger Cases, 66 Micti. L. REV. 142, 143; Comment, Di-
vestiture in Light of the El Paso Experience, 48 TEx. L. REv. 792 1970), Comment, The
Power of the FTC to Obtain Preliminary Injunctions from Circuit Courts to Bar Pro-
posed Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 1105, 1111-13.
41. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 542-43 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
42. For example, in United States v. Northwest Industries, 301 F. Supp, 1066 (N.D.
Ill. 1968), the government sought to enjoin defendant's acquisition of the B.F. Goodrich
Company. Judge Will denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, but held that
[S]ince it is our ultimate obligation to preserve the status quo to the maximum
extent possible pending a full hearing, a comprehensive hold separate and status
quo order will be entered requiring Northwest (1) to take all steps necessary to
maintain Goodrich as a separate, viable, going concern; (2) take no action which
might impair its ability to comply with any future order of divestiture; (3) preserve
and protect all assets of Goodrich; (4) take no action which will substantially diminish
the operations of Goodrich or dispose of any assets of Goodrich, except in the ordinary
course of business, without further order of this Court; (5) refrain from using tile
name Goodrich or identifying the relationship between Goodrich and Northwest
in any advertising, sales or promotional activities pertaining to the business of
either corporation; (6) refrain from engaging in any reciprocity practices in either
Goodrich or Northwest and take appropriate steps to insure compliance with this
prohibition; (7) refrain from issuing any additional securities of Goodrich or incur.
ring any additional indebtedness of Goodrich other than in the ordinary course of
business without further order of this Court; (8) retain unencumbered all shares of
Goodrich which it may own subject to further order of this Court, and (9) take
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nary injunctions first must have rejected at least implicitly the possi-
bility of merely issuing a hold-separate order, no court has ever thor-
oughly analyzed this type of relief. Unfortunately, the supposed ad-
vantages of hold-separate orders are largely ephemeral. Divestiture of
independent subsidiaries has proven to be as difficult and unsuccessful
as divestiture of fully integrated operations. For example, in United
States v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., a district court denied a preliminary
injunction but issued a hold-separate order.43 When divestiture was
finally ordered,44 the former assets were sold to another large corpo-
ration. This was the closest the court could come to restoring the pre-
merger market situation, but it was very far from a full restoration.
Parallel situations have produced similar results, showing that hold-
separate orders cannot restore the pre-merger market situation.
4
5
III. Balance of Hardships
Finally, a trial court considering a motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion against a merger must "balance [against the damage to plaintiff
or the public] the harm to defendant likely to result if the relief is
granted."'4 6 Thus, a court must weigh the irreparable harm caused by
the merger against the injury suffered by the acquiring company. The
company that seeks the merger will always suffer some losses if con-
summation is enjoined. The value of its stock will decline; it will lose
the anticipated benefit of the acquisition; and it will lose the value
of the resources (time and money) invested in the effort to arrange
the merger.4 7 In addition, defendants often assert that a preliminary
injunction will permanently preclude consummation because of the
vagaries of the economy. No established standards exist for measuring
these types of injuries, just as no method exists for quantifying in-
juries to plaintiffs. Each court exercises its equitable discretion in
deciding the weights to be applied to the parties' damages, and "the
weight must prevail in favor of the moving party before the injunc-
tion is granted." 48
such other action or refrain from such other action as the Court, after hearing,
may deem necessary to achieve maximum preservation of the status quo consistent
with the effective day-to-day operation of Goodrich. Id. at 1097.
43. 1956 Trade Cas. 68,244 (E.D. Mo.).
44. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
45. See Note, Preliminary Relief for the Government Under Section 7 of tie Clayton
Act, 79 HAnv. L. REv. 391 (1965). Contra, Lewis, Preliminary Injunction; in Government
Section 7 Litigation, 17 AN-TrRusr BULL. 1 (1972).
46. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 743 (2d Cir. 1933).
47. See United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
48. Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp. 146, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
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In government suits, varying approaches have been taken to the
peculiar nature of the public interest. Some courts have held that the
public interest is always paramount, making weighting of relative
hardships unnecessary. 49 But most courts insist upon balancing the
equities by canvassing the relative adequacy of the various available
forms of relief. Thus, the common question posed by courts in their
concern over the relative hardships to the public as against the private
defendant is essentially the same question posed by consideration of
irreparable harm, that is, "whether a subsequent divestiture would or
would not adequately protect the public interest."' 0
The only new factor is the effect of preliminary relief upon con-
summation of the merger if the trial court finds no violation of Section
7. Many courts seem to accept defendants' claims that a preliminary
injunction will permanently eliminate the possibility of merger be-
cause of the uncertainties of the financial markets."' According to the
usual argument, a merger agreement depends upon the status of the
financial markets as of the time of the agreement, and delay will be
accompanied by changes in those markets, thereby destroying the
agreement. This argument implies that the most compelling reason
for the merger is the favorable conjunction of the markets for the two
companies' securities. Such a reason should not be the basis for allow-
ing immediate consummation of a merger in the face of countervailing
market-competition considerations. The Clayton Act focuses only on
competitive effects, without regard for the status of the parties' securi-
ties on the financial markets. A merger violates Section 7 unless it is
justified by the competitive situation, irrespective of such financial,
implications. The impetus for a legal merger must come from its po-
tential pro-competitive effects. If at one point in time this potential is
sufficient to justify the merger, then it will still be sufficient several
years later unless one of four events intervenes.
(1) One of the parties may merge with a third party. In this case,
society has not suffered because the gains will be realized with less
risk of realizing the anticompetitive effects.
(2) One or both of the parties may have achieved the anticipated
economies through its own internal efforts. In such a case, society has
49. United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Snpp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964); United States v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. White
Consolidated Industries, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
50. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir. 1963).
51. E.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. American General Insurance Co., 232 F. Supp. 620
(D.D.C. 1964); see also FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 621-22, 631-32 (1966)
(Fortas, J., dissenting). Contra, United States v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc.,
323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
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clearly received all the benefits that might have resulted from the
merger without the potential drawbacks.
(3) The nature of the relevant lines of commerce may have
changed so that the originally expected economies are no longer
available. In this type of situation, society has benefited from the
preliminary injunction because if the merger had been allowed to
proceed, within a short period of time its benefits would have dis-
appeared, but its negative effects would have persisted.
(4) The cost of litigating the preliminary injunction and re-
negotiating the merger may be greater than the potential benefits to
the companies involved. These potential benefits to the companies
include those that result from factors beneficial to society and those
that are detrimental. As substantial as the costs of litigation and re-
negotiation may be, if they are not substantially less than the antici-
pated value of the merger, cost-reduction and monopolistic aspects
of the merger are likely to be so marginal as to preclude weighing.
Therefore, it is as likely that an anticompetitive merger was avoided
as that improved competition was forestalled.
Thus, if a merger is truly oriented toward increased efficiency rather
than enhanced market power, it will remain so for the period of time
necessary for a district court to consider fully the legal questions in-
volved, no matter how long that time may last. If after such full con-
sideration it is held that the proposed merger would be legal, the same
impetus to join would exist and the merger would be consummated.
Accordingly, any balancing of hardships must favor a grant of a pre-
liminary injunction. If the public loss is considered-which it must be in
government suits by definition and in private suits by direction of the
Supreme Court- 2-the balance necessarily tips in favor of the injunc-
tion. If the merger is not enjoined, the public suffers forever some in-
evitable and irreversible anticompetitive effect. By contrast, if the
merger is enjoined, the maximum potential loss to the merger partners
is the benefits of the merger for the period of the litigation. If upon fi-
nal adjudication a permanent injunction issues, these companies would
have lost nothing to which they had a legal right and therefore they
would have suffered no hardship that the district court should have
considered before issuing the preliminary injunction. Similarly, the
abandonment of plans for the merger (after issuance of a preliminary
injunction) is evidence that the merger was certainly undesirable and
illegal, and again the defendants would have lost nothing to which
52. See p. 162 supra.
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they were entitled. The only possible loss they might suffer would be
the benefits of the merger pendente lite in the event the preliminary
injunction is vacated upon final adjudication. Thus, the possible loss
of a few years' extra profits must be balanced against the permanent
irreparable harm which the public may suffer. If the private plain-
tiff's damage is considered, the same result is inevitable. Again, the
maximum possible loss to the defendant is of a temporary nature.
Once the injury to the plaintiff is allowed to be perfected by con-
summation of the merger, however, it is at least partially permanent,
irreversible and irreparable.
IV. Dangers of Abuse
In view of this reconsideration of the requirements of Sections 15
and 16, courts should issue a preliminary injunction in every merger
case, government as well as private. True, there is a danger that per-
functory granting of preliminary injunctions might well produce
abuses, but this danger can be easily and effectively avoided. Liberal
use of preliminary injunctions might increase the possibility of strike
suits designed solely to blackmail the defendant into settling the suit
in order to avoid the disruptive effect of litigation. Such suits are
unlikely under Section 16 because money damages are not available
under that statute. The statute itself, however, provides the best pos-
sible preventive medicine: the requirement that the plaintiff post a
bond against the damage from an injunction improvidently granted.
This tool, generally ignored by the courts in Section 16 actions, 8 has
proved to be an effective device for restraining strike suits in other
contexts54 and should have the same effect in Section 16 proceedings.
Furthermore, the district court may simply refuse to dismiss the action
even if the original plaintiff seeks to do so, and invite new parties, such
as the Department of Justice or a state attorney-general, to prosecute
the action. 5
Another possible abuse might arise if a company's management
sought to use a preliminary injunction to forestall merger with one
suitor in order to merge with another.50 In such a situation plaintiff's
management objects not to merger per se, but rather simply seeks the
53. Note 2 supra.
54. See Note, Security for Expenses Legislation-Summary, Analysis, and Critique, 52
COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1952).
55. Cf. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
56. Compare Lunkenheimer Co. v. Condec Corp., 268 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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merger most beneficial to its own interests, not necessarily identical
to the interests of society protected by Section 7. Denying the prelimi-
nary injunction and 'allowing the challenged tender offer to proceed
is one method to avoid this type of abuse, but it is unsatisfactory. The
impure motives of plaintiff's management should not prevent the court
from taking into full consideration the substantive legal issues they
raise. The "unclean hands" condition of the plaintiff is not a valid
defense against an allegation of violation of the antitrust laws.5'
Granting the injunction, together with requiring that plaintiff post a
substantial bond, would sufficiently bar this abuse.
In the context of government suits, objections to pro forma pre-
liminary injunctions will take two forms. First, the rule may be feared
for its possible chilling effect upon contemplated mergers, a seriously
adverse effect for the business community. But such fears are entitled
to little attention because Congress itself sought this effect:
The purpose of the proposed bill [Section 7 of the Clayton Act
as amended in 1950], is to limit future increases in the level of
economic concentration resulting from corporate mergers and
acquisitions.
While there exist many differences of opinion on other aspects
of the monopoly problem, there is substantial agreement that the
level of economic concentration is extremely high.
The enactment of the bill will limit further growth of monopoly
and thereby aid in preserving small business as an important com-
petitive factor in the American economy.5
8
The second objection to making the grant of preliminary injunc-
tions virtually automatic will be that it would leave no check on the
power of the Department of Justice to block a merger for reasons not
based in law and economics, especially political grudges. This objec-
tion, too, is unconvincing. Actually, the proposal represents no sig-
nificant change in the Department's power. Presently, over 90% of
all mergers are submitted to pre-review clearance, and only rarely do
parties proceed in the face of a contrary Justice Department position.5
Also, although there have been charges that the government has failed
to challenge alleged antitrust violations for political reasons, it has
never been claimed that specific targets have been chosen because of
their political status. More importantly, the existence of political mo-
57. Kiefer-Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
58. S. R P. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
59. Hearings on S. 1698 Before the Subcomn. on Domestic Finance of the House
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 197 (1965).
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tives for a merger challenge is hardly a good reason for the courts to
allow the merger to proceed despite its illegality. Thus, more rational
and consistent enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton Act will result
from a general pro forma rule of granting government motions for
preliminary injunctions against mergers.
V. Conclusion
Absent any genuine potential for abuse, issuing a preliminary in-
junction should become pro forma in every action challenging a pro-
posed merger as violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Every merger
presents at least a reasonable probability of violating Section 7.
And every merger results in irreparable harm to the public and to
private parties that is not outweighed by the short-term losses suffered
by the acquiring party in the event of an injunction.
Preliminary relief is designed to prevent some statutory violation
in its incipiency. Other antitrust statutes, like Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, are designed to prevent incipient evils. Section 3 of the Clayton
Act tracks the language of Section 7 and prohibits tying and exclusive
dealing arrangements whose effect "may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly."00 Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, which outlaws "unfair methods of competi-
tion," 61 also reaches incipient anticompetitive conduct.0 2 A similar
rule might be considered for the granting of preliminary injunctions
under such statutes, with considerations to be balanced. Under Section
7 of the Clayton Act, however, the balance is clear: the routine issuance
of preliminary injunctions against mergers-in effect, incipient relief
against an incipient lessening of competition-is the only effective
method for avoiding the mergers condemned by the Act. "[A]fter the
saber thrust, the wound is still there," one court has said.0U "The pur-
pose of the injunction is to prevent the wound if it is at all possible to
do S0.
''04
60. 15 US.C. § 14 (1970). For a discussion of § 's incipiency nature, see Standard
Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
62. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233 (1972); FTC v. Motion Picture Ad.
vertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
63. Crane Co. v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 280 F.2d 747, 750 (6th Cir. 1960).
64. Id.
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